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Abstract—Security in MPSoC is gaining an increasing at-
tention since several years. Digital convergence is one of the
numerous reasons explaining such a focus on embedded systems
as much sensitive and secret data are now stored, manipulated
and exchanged in these systems. Most solutions are currently
built at the software level; we believe hardware enhancements
also play a major role in system protection. One strategic point is
the communication layer as all data goes through it. Monitoring
and controlling communications enable to fend off attacks before
system corruption. In this work, we propose an efficient solution
with several hardware enhancements to secure data exchanges
in a bus-based MPSoC. Our approach relies on low complexity
distributed firewalls connected to all critical IPs of the system.
Designers can deploy different security policies (access right,
data format, authentication, confidentiality) in order to protect
the system in a flexible way. To illustrate the benefit of such a
solution, implementations are discussed for different MPSoCs
implemented on Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGAs. Results demonstrate a
reduction up to 33% in terms of latency overhead compared to
existing efforts.
Keywords-communication; security; MPSoC; bus; cryptogra-
phy; external memory; firewall; latency
I. INTRODUCTION
In daily life as in many industrial environments, electronic
devices (smartphones, computers...) manage numerous infor-
mation that must be protected from potential attackers. These
devices generally perform high-performance algorithms in
a single chip while manipulating sensitive data (passwords,
private information).
For these systems, a trade-off between area, latency and
memory consumption is mandatory when building secu-
rity mechanisms to meet implementation requirements while
guaranteeing an efﬁcient protection against attacks. Reconﬁg-
urable technologies such as FPGAs can be a good candidate
to build such systems as they embed processors, memories
and application-speciﬁc IPs in a single chip with moderate
development costs [1]. A way to reduce the performance
impact of security mechanisms is to consider hardware solu-
tions and to develop a distributed protection [2]. One strategic
point is the on-chip communication architecture as all data is
exposed to its structure. Thus it is of paramount importance
to protect these data exchanges in order to keep critical
information within the system. Indeed many attacks can be
detected through a thorough monitoring of data exchanges
within the system. The goal of this work is to propose a
solution based on security-enhanced interfaces between IPs
in a MPSoC implemented on a FPGA technology.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
related work. Section III details the threat model. Section IV
describes our contribution and Section V proposes several
results. Section VI highlights main perspectives.
II. RELATED WORK
In the literature, several studies have addressed the security
of embedded systems [3]. At the communication level, these
systems can be protected either by software or hardware
mechanisms. Software solutions generally do not request
additional hardware but offer low efﬁciency in terms of
latency which can be critical for applications where reactivity
is essential to fend off attacks. From an hardware point of
view, several solutions have been proposed depending on the
communication architecture: network-on-chip (NoC) or bus.
Regarding NoC-based architectures, Evain et al. [4] propose
a solution where security controls are done in each network
interface in a distributed manner. A management unit gathers
all information from network interfaces according to a user-
deﬁned security policy. Fiorin et al. [5] propose an alternative
to this work by adding probes within the interface structure
to reﬁne the protection mechanisms. Each security-enhanced
interface, considered as a trusted component, is composed
by a set of probes, protection units and a kernel providing
network management services. These probes can block in-
coming trafﬁc according to parameters stored in an embedded
context-addressable memory. A security manager collects
information from individual security-enhanced interfaces to
detect any collision or error in the trafﬁc.
For bus-based communication architectures, one of the most
signiﬁcant work was done by Coburn et al. [6]. This approach
is similar to Fiorin’s work and is based on SEI (Security En-
forcement Interface) implemented in each interface between
an IP and the bus. Each SEI computes information from the
data handled by the IP and sends it to a global manager
(SEM, Security Enforcement Module). The main limitation of
this solution is that all controls are performed in the SEM. It
leads to a latency penalty which should be avoided to mitigate
security overhead.
Other works provide solutions for the protection of embedded
systems: Huffmire et al. [7] introduce the approach of physi-
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cal isolation using moats and drawbridges; ARM proposes
a commercial architecture name Trustzone [8] which is
based on a normal/secure separation using a secure kernel
and an access driver. This work is an in-depth description
and implementation study of the solution introduced in [2].
It takes advantages of both NoC/bus-based approaches by
proposing hardware security enhancements distributed on
each IP with low-latency control features. This approach




SECA Fiorin Our work
[6] [5]
HW resources SEI, SEM Probes, LF, CF
protection units
Security Monitoring Monitoring Monitoring
enhancement and veriﬁcation and veriﬁcation and veriﬁcation
Crypto. No No Yes
features
Threat Wide range of Mainly buffer Wide range of
model soft. attacks overﬂow soft. attacks
Distributed / Centralized Distributed Distributed
Centralized
Our solution aims to be a latency-efﬁcient protection mech-
anism with an additional cryptographic layer for protection of
external memory units (see Table I). Our solution only relies
on hardware enhancements (LF and CF as will be explained
in Section IV) and does not require modiﬁcation at the
application level neither in the operating system. Compared to
existing efforts, we address a wide range of software attacks
through a distributed approach and handle cryptographic
features to deal with conﬁdentiality and authentication.
The key contributions of this paper include:
• Design and demonstration of dedicated ﬁrewalls.
• Promotion of ﬂexible security policy (access right, data
format, authentication, conﬁdentiality).




This work considers that attackers can only tamper with
the embedded system using logical attacks (side-channel
and other physical threats are not considered). Besides that,
it is assumed that the target FPGA is trusted. Therefore,
the only way to access the system is through the external
memory and the external bus (Figure 1). A solution would
be to encrypt and authenticate the whole external memory.
Unfortunately, this solution has a high cost in terms of
resources consumption and latency overhead [9]. For many
applications, building a ﬂexible solution where only the most
critical code and/or data sections to be stored in the external
memory are protected with cryptographic services is a good
choice. Other parts of the memory can be in plaintext or only
authenticated [10].
In this case, attackers still have possibilities to compromise
the system by tampering non protected parts of the external
memory. Indeed, when code and/or data are protected, any
change will be detected; but if code and/or data are considered
uncritical, no check is performed. Thus, such solutions need
to be extended and system designers need other mechanisms
to monitor system activity and detect any abnormal behavior.
This work proposes to address this point. All communications
are checked by security mechanisms mentioned further as
ﬁrewalls. This additional layer of security provides an efﬁ-
cient solution while maintaining a good area/latency trade-off.
B. Security policies
Security enhancements presented in this work are based
on built-in Security Policies (SP) stored in trusted memory
units which include a set of parameters required for ab-
normal behavior detection (see Section IV-D). Basically, it
contains read/write access speciﬁcations (read/write, write-
only, read-only), authorized data format (i.e. 8, 16 and 32 bits)
and cryptographic information (conﬁdentiality/authentication
modes, encryption key and MAC). Threat model deﬁned in
[2] is covered using these parameters. Timestamp tags are
used to monitor the access time to the external memory (to
detect replay attacks). Spooﬁng and relocation attacks are also
addressed (using address and authentication primitives).
IV. HARDWARE FIREWALLS
In order to prevent any MPSoC system from the threat
model previously deﬁned, ﬁrewalls are implemented within
the system. This section ﬁrst presents an overview of these
blocks. Then a detailed analysis of their architecture from an
hardware point of view with latency and memory requirement
information is proposed.




























Figure 1. Embedded distributed architecture with security enhancements
The target system is composed of processors, internal
memories, dedicated IPs embedded within an FPGA and
connected to an external memory. All resources within the
FPGA are connected to a bus based on the AXI communi-
cation standard from ARM. We propose to add a speciﬁc
interface to each resource (IP or processor) in order to
build a secure gateway to the bus. Using these interfaces
(also known as ﬁrewalls in this work), we can monitor all
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communications before they reach the bus and propagate
within the system. Figure 1 shows such a system with
internal resources and an external memory. Each resource
is connected to a speciﬁc interface called Local Firewall
providing services for read/write access control and so on.
The external memory is also connected to a speciﬁc interface
called Cryptographic Firewall adding cryptographic features
(conﬁdentiality, authentication...). As security parameters can
be applied only to speciﬁc parts of IPs (deﬁned through
security policies), ﬁrewalls are also responsible for ﬁlter-
ing access to/from the external memory. This feature is of
paramount importance when plaintext data or code (which
may not have been ciphered) is manipulated. In this case, even
processors executing malicious code (that could have been
stored in plaintext in the external memory) can be blocked
by ﬁrewalls. Any illegal read or write access will be detected
and discarded.
Security Policies are stored in Block RAMs (memory blocks
embedded within the FPGA) which are considered as trusted
(no attack is taken into account).
B. Common blocks
Each ﬁrewall is composed of several blocks (such as Secu-
rity Builder and Firewall Interface) connected to each others
(Figure 2). While Security Builder is the core managing
security policies, Firewall Interface is the crossing point with
the external world. It acts as a bridge between the system
AXI-4 communication bus and the associated IP (custom
IP, I/O controller, external memory controller). The whole
ﬁrewall structure is considered as trusted, the only untrusted
area is the external bus and the external memory itself (i.e.
































































Figure 2. Structure of a ﬁrewall
1) Firewall Interface: Firewall Interface is tagged 1 in
Figure 2. Two main tasks are performed by a Firewall
Interface (FI):
• Once a data is declared as valid, the FI transmits the
data to the target element (communication bus or IP), it
is performed by the Decision Module.
• The FI synchronizes handshake communication sig-
nals (such as AXI WSTRB, AXI WLAST, AXI WVALID,
AXI RREADY...) in order not to misbehave communica-
tion trafﬁc (duplication or omission of data). Synchro-
nization Module is based on a set of ﬂip-ﬂops where the
clock input signal (i.e. a rising edge) is the acknowledg-
ment signal check out sent by the Security Builder when
all the SP-checking operations are completed.
As all these ﬂip-ﬂops are connected in parallel, the latency
of Firewall Interface is two clock cycles for a 32-bit data (one
for the Decision Module and one for the synchronization).
For N 32-bit data (without burst or pipeline management),
the equation is:
latency(N) = N ∗ 2. (1)
In case pipeline is activated (not yet considered in this work),
the equation for an m-stage pipeline architecture becomes
latency(N) = m+N − 1. Firewall Interface would need 2
cycles for the ﬁrst data and 1 cycle for each following data
(while datan is processed by the Synchronization Module,
datan+1 is processed by the Decision Module).
2) Security Builder: Security Builder is the main compo-
nent of ﬁrewalls (tagged 2 in Figure 2). It is based on four
modules:
• Correspondence Table (CorrTable). Security Policies
are stored in a trusted Block RAM (left side of Figure 2)
and can be identiﬁed by an address. CorrTable deﬁnes
the SP address for a given bus target address space in
1 clock cycle. For instance, bus address 0x1234ABCD
(in the address space [0x12340000;0x1234FFFF]) is
managed by the Security Policy located at BRAM ad-
dress 0xFF00FF00. The correspondence between these
addresses will be performed in the CorrTable module.
• Reading Module (ReadMod). ReadMod is responsible
for reading the Security Policy from the dedicated Block
RAM and extracting the security parameters to be sent
to the Checking Module. For a single 32-bit data, a
read buffer is ﬁlled in 1 clock cycle then SP parameters
extraction (to be sent to the Checking Module) requires
1 additional cycle.
• Checking Module (CheckMod). In fact, the Checking
Module is a set of individual comparators speciﬁc to
each security parameter (read/write, format...) deﬁned in
the Security Policies and computed in parallel (Figure


































Figure 3. Checking module
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inputs of a comparator do not match, output signal goes
high. A Security Policy requires 1 clock cycle to be
veriﬁed.
• Finite State Machine (FSM). FSM manages the algo-
rithm running in each ﬁrewall.
Timing diagram in Figure 4 represents the behavior of the
Security Builder. According to the timing diagram, the veriﬁ-
Figure 4. Security Builder timing diagram
cation of a single 32-bit data takes 4 clock cycles. Therefore,
checking N 32-bit data without pipeline is deﬁned by this
equation:
latency(N) = N ∗ 4 (2)
In case pipeline is activated (not yet considered in this work),
the equation for an m-stage pipeline architecture becomes
latency(N) = 3N − m(m − 2). At this stage, the only
difference between Local and Cryptographic Firewall is the
Security Builder. As Security Policies do not contain the
same security parameters, Reading Module and Checking
Module have a different structure (see IV-D). Furthermore,
































































Figure 5. AES-GCM architecture for a 32-bit data in write mode
The solution presented in this work provides ﬂexible cryp-
tographic services based on the AES-GCM algorithm [11].
As shown in Figure 5, a single core has been developed
to perform ”conﬁdentiality and authentication” or ”authen-
tication only” (mux and demux ports are routed according
to Security Policy parameters related to conﬁdentiality and
authentication modes Cmode and Imode); keys needed for
encryption/decryption are sent by the Security Builder (as for
MAC information). In Figure 5, encryption of a 32-bit data
(Ek uses a 128-bit key and a 128-bit vector containing the
32-bit data padded with zeros), is done in 10 clock cycles and
authentication is done in 2 clock cycles (through 2 multipliers
multH [10]). The overall latency for a set of N 32-bit data
protected by conﬁdentiality and authentication is:
latency(N) = 10 + (10 + 2) ∗N (3)
Using the AES-GCM algorithm, ﬁrewalls can perform low-
latency cryptographic features with an acceptable resources
consumption. Especially for authentication, AES-GCM takes
2 clock cycles while implementation of hash functions such as
MD5 (respectively SHA-2) takes 64 (respectively 80) cycles
to do so. The tag issued from the AES-GCM core is not
ciphered since it is stored in a trusted embedded memory
(Block RAM) separated from the SP memory. As Block
RAMs are dual-port memories, one port is left empty for
further reconﬁguration by a dedicated processor.
D. Security Policies
Each ﬁrewall (Local and Cryptographic) has its own 16KB
Block RAM containing Security Policies directly connected
to the Reading Module. Security Policies are indexed by
the Correspondence Table previously deﬁned. Local Firewall
SP is stored on a single 32-bit block while Cryptographic
Firewall SP is stored on 6 blocks (LF and CF in Figure 6).
Each block is indexed by an address (for instance, address 0)
which helps the Reading Module to know where to read the
ﬁrst block of the target Security Policy. In case of reading a
Cryptographic Firewall Security Policy, a few logic is added
to the Reading Module in order to read all the SP blocks only
knowing the address of the ﬁrst block.
Figure 6 shows a layout of Block RAMs containing Security
LF1






























1: Read/Write access (2 bits)
2: Allowed format (2 bits)
3: Confidentiality mode (1 bit)


















Figure 6. SP memory layout for Local and Cryptographic Firewalls
Policies for Local and Cryptographic ﬁrewalls. As BRAM
data ports are 32-bit wide, a Security Policy for a LF is stored
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on 32 bits while CF SP is stored on 6*32 bits. Therefore, in
terms of latency, reading a LF Security Policy takes 1 clock
cycle (reading a 32-bits word in a block RAM is done in 1
clock cycle) instead of 6 for a SP set for a Cryptographic
Firewall. Each ﬁrewall has its own Block RAM, separated
from Timestamps and MACs memories, with one port left
empty for reconﬁguration by a speciﬁc processor (ability to
reconﬁgure the overall protection if an attack is detected).
The structure of ﬁelds labeled as #1, #2, #3, #4 is described




Field Rule 00 01 10 11
#1 Read all. No No Yes Yes
Write all. No Yes No Yes
#2 Format 4 8 16 32
Values
Field Rule 0 1
#3 Conﬁdentiality No Yes
#4 Authentication No Yes
bits allow to correctly connect data ports to the AES-GCM
core in order to perform all the needed cryptographic modes
(authentication only, plaintext and so on).
V. RESULTS
All the following results have been implemented on a
ML605 Xilinx board including a Virtex-6 xc6vlx240t1156-
1 FPGA. This device has around 240,000 logic cells and
15 Mb of Block RAM. First, performances of ﬁrewalls are
given as standalone blocks. Then, case studies are proposed
to verify performances of such security enhancements and




DETAILED SYNTHESIS RESULTS OF FIREWALLS
Slices Slice LUTs #
Regs BRAMs
Local FI 76 120 68 0
Firewall SB 23 3 55 1
Total 99 123 293 1
FI 76 120 153 0
Crypto SB 23 3 55 1
Firewall CM 1,166 2,038 2,396 14
89.42% 94.31% 89.10% 93.33%
Total 1,304 2,161 2,689 15
MicroBlaze 1,179 1,298 1,829 10
All the measures were compared to the Xilinx Microblaze
softcore processor (default conﬁguration with 8KB data and
instructions caches). Each ﬁrewall (Local and Cryptographic)
is implemented with two dummy security policies. A Local
Firewall has low area consumption while Cryptographic Fire-
wall exceeds Microblaze results. This is mainly due to CM
(the AES-GCM core) which consumes around 90% of the
CF area (see Table III). Otherwise, ﬁrewalls are lightweight
in terms of consumed area compared to the Microblaze
microprocessor (in terms of registers, a Local Firewall takes
around 10% of resources needed for a Microblaze processor).
Once we know the resources needed for each ﬁrewall, a
set of rules can be deﬁned to estimate the area needed for
a multiprocessor architecture with x Local and y Crypto
Firewalls. Following equations set takes into account the
”worst case” implementation values with 10 SPs for each
Correspondence Table (this limit is due to the implementation
of the Correspondence Table which needs 3 registers for
each security policy while implementation tools allow 32
conﬁgurable registers at most for each ﬁrewall).
numSlices = 138 ∗ x+ 1, 304 ∗ y (4)
numRegs = 123 ∗ x+ 2, 161 ∗ y (5)
numLuts = 293 ∗ x+ 2, 689 ∗ y (6)
Using this equations set, a designer is able to compute
the area consumed by security enhancements on his
own MPSoC for a ﬁxed number of Security Policies
embedded in each ﬁrewall. It is important to note that
the Correspondence Table area increase regarding the
number of SPs is acceptable: from 9 up to 48 slices and
32 up to 117 regarding LUTs (respectively for 1 and 10 SPs).
Latency:
In order to measure the latency of ﬁrewalls, simulations were
done to generate the following scenarios:
• S0: Latency of a Local Firewall.
• S1: Communication between two on-chip components.
• S2: Communication between a processor and the exter-
nal memory in C+A mode.
• S3: Communication between a processor and the exter-
nal memory in Authentication only mode.
• S4: Communication between a processor and the exter-
nal memory in plaintext mode.
Each scenario was run for a single 32-bit data: S0 is a
reference measure, others scenarios involve two components
of a ﬁrewall-enhanced MPSoC architecture (S2 to S4 involve
one Local and one Crypto Firewall while S1 needs two Local
Firewalls). Figure 7 shows the results of these implementa-
tions.
Of course, the most critical scenario in terms of latency (28
cycles) is when a data is written in the external memory in
S2 (in case of a read, the penalty is not so high). S1 and
S4 are quite close because, in this implementation, there is
no Checking Module (1 cycle saved) in a CF and reading
a Cryptographic SP takes 5 more cycles than for Local
Firewall: therefore, S4 takes 4 more cycles than S1.
Memory occupancy:
In this section, only Security Policies are considered. Times-
tamps and Tags (MACs) memories occupancies are not
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Figure 7. Latency scenarios
the application [9]. According to the formulation of Security
Policies, a single policy for a Local Firewall takes 4 Bytes
(24 Bytes for a CF because of cryptographic material). Two
options are considered in this work:
• Each CPU has uniform rights on other IPs: for instance,
1 CPU can write the whole DDR memory in plaintext
mode. This case can be represented by one Security
Policy.
• Each CPU has N ”options” on each target IP: in this
case, for example, 1 processor can read a plaintext
address space of the external memory and write a
ciphered and authenticated data in another address space
(see Figure 1). Several Security Policies are used in this
option.
The second option is a generalization of a basic implementa-
tion. The more instances of SPs we have for each component
of an architecture, the more memory is needed. Figure 8
shows the number of bytes consumed for N IPs (X axis)
































Figure 8. Memory occupancy
occupancy follows a linear function. Considering a large
system (16 IPs + 1 external memory, which represents a
threshold for a single-layer communication bus), Security
Policy consumes around 90,000 bits (nearly 11KB, less





























Code MB1 (64 KB)
Data MB2 (64 KB)
Data MB1  (64 KB)
Code MB2  (64 KB)
Data MB1  (64 KB)
Figure 9. Case study architecture
B. Case study #1: custom architecture
1) Hardware: The case study is based on a dual-processor
architecture (Xilinx Microblaze softcores with 8KB data and
instruction caches). There are two IPs: ”Shared Memory”
is a shared Block RAM of 64 KB and Hard. Acc. is
an image processing IP (threshold function) with a set of
registers (Figure 9). The external memory contains data and
code sections for both processors. This work considers that
external memory is split in ﬁve parts (64KBytes each): two
parts for processor #1 (code and data) and three sections
for processor #2 (code and two data sections, with different
cryptographic policies).
Contents can be either protected by conﬁdentiality and au-
thentication (C11 and D11), authentication only (D12) or
even plaintext (C2 and D2). Each processor also has speciﬁc
access to the two internal IPs (in terms of Read/Write access
context): for Hard. Acc.,MB1 can read and write whileMB2
can only write; for Shared BRAM,MB1 can only read,MB2
read and write.
2) Benchmark application: In order to set up this system
as a base for further analysis, an application was deﬁned to
make all key situations happen (accesses to the external mem-
ory, internal communications and so on). This benchmark
application, represented by the sequence diagram in Figure
10, is based on a symbolic JPEG ﬁle (previously ciphered and
written in the external memory by a conﬁguration processor)
which is processed and transmitted from one block to another.
According to the former hardware description, the external
memory contents are split in different sections with several
Security Policy instances.
Table IV
SYNTHESIS RESULTS OF THE CASE STUDY #1
Slices Slice LUTs #
Regs BRAMs
Case study 5,446 7,195 8,354 32
w/o firewalls
Case study 7,302 9,848 12,215 51
w/ firewalls +34.08% +36.87% +46.22% +37.25%
When the case study is implemented with security en-
hancements, the area consumption is around 40% higher than
the unprotected version (nearly 46% for LUTs in Table IV).






























Figure 10. Benchmark sequence diagram
• picProc is the application described in the sequence
diagram.
• picDrm is a sample DRM application run by one proces-
sor while the other processor does read/write operations.
• picDec is a classic software AES decryption done by
one processor which also accesses the external memory.
Table V
BENCH APPLICATIONS RESULTS
Exe. time # of # of Lat.
(ms) cache miss DDR access Overhead
picProc 3,623 12,672,395 34,063,398 17.76%
picDrm 1,084 3,017,237 9,462,055 9.43%
picDec 382 793,226 4,736,966 4.18%
picProc is the largest application (in terms of code size): as
there are more accesses to the external memory, the penalty
induced by ﬁrewalls is higher.
C. Case study #2: other platforms
We also evaluated our solution for two platforms. The ﬁrst
one is the NEC’s MP21x application SoC, also studied by
Coburn et al. [6]. Figure 11 shows a simpliﬁed view of this
system. There are 3 ARM 926 CPUs, a cryptoprocessor able
to run several algorithms (RSA, AES and so on). NEC MP21x
platform also has Security Policies (as it has been deﬁned in
previous sections). For this case study, it is considered that
each CPU has uniform rights on other IPs (for instance, 1
CPU has only one set of rights on the cryptoprocessor). The
second platform is the Samsung Exynos 4210 SoC based on
a dual-core ARM Cortex A9 platform used, for instance,
in smartphones such as the Galaxy SII (from Samsung).
It also has secure memory blocks, video peripherals and a
cryptographic engine.
1) Area: According to the NEC platform schematic, we






















































Figure 11. NEC MP21x simpliﬁed architecture
and need to be protected by cryptographic services. There-
fore, 5 LF and 2 CF (SDRAM et Flash I/F) are needed for
this case study. For the Exynos 4210 platform, 12 LF and 1
CF (Memory Interface) are required.
Table VI
SYNTHESIS RESULTS OF NEC AND SAMSUNG PLATFORMS
# of Slices Slice LUTs #
LF + CF Regs BRAMs
MP21x 5 + 2 3,298 4,937 6,843 35
Exynos 4210 12 + 1 2,960 3,637 6,205 27
According to Table VI, ﬁrewall enhancements takes 8.75%
of a medium-scale Virtex-6 FPGA (xc6vlx240t) for the
NEC MP21x platform. A Samsung Exynos 4210 platform is
secured by ﬁrewalls with 7.86% of a medium-scale Virtex-6
FPGA (xc6vlx240t).
2) Memory occupancy: We consider that in a MPSoC
system, each IP needs only 1 Security Policy. To calculate
the equation giving the memory occupancy for x LF and y
CF, it is assumed that:
• Each IP attached to a LF has access to all other IPs
of the system (including external memories). There are
x+ y IPs in the system, an IP cannot interact on itself
and each LF security policy takes 32 bits. Therefore,
total memory occupancy of LFs follows the equation
(x+ y − 1) ∗ 32x.
• Each IP attached to a LF has access to the external
memory (in this case, each IP needs 1 Security Policy).
In the external memory mapping, there is an address
space for each IP, each address space is managed by
a 192-bits CF security policy. Memory occupancy of
a Cryptographic Firewall is governed by the equation
192x (192xy if y CF in the system).
The evolution of memory occupancy for NEC and Samsung
platforms follows the surface equation 32x2 + 224xy− 32x.
Even with a high protection granularity (20 Security Policies
for each IP), SP memory occupancy costs are quite acceptable
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(864 Bytes for Samsung Exynos 4210 platform and 360
Bytes for NEC MP21x). In this analysis, tags storage is
not considered and this point can signiﬁcantly increase the
memory overhead if a uniform security policy is considered
[9].
D. Comparison over existing works
A comparison with related works is done in terms of area
overheads. The area results for our work does not take into
account the Cryptographic Module because Coburn [6] and
Fiorin [5] do not have ciphering features in their solutions.
Xilinx Microblaze processor was taken as a reference for
Table VII
SECURITY OVER PROCESSOR AREA RATIOS
area(security enhancement)
area(processor)
Coburn [6] (16KB / 150 MHz) 6.20%
Fiorin [5] (8KB / 100 MHz) 25%
Our solution (8KB / 100 MHz) 11.30%
Table VII, individual conﬁgurations are indicated between
brackets (caches size and clock frequency). In Table VII,
our solution has a ratio lower than the Data Protection
Unit system [5]: this may be due to the CAM system
which is more complex than a Block RAM. SECA-based
solution has a lower impact because the kernel (containing
security conﬁgurations) is not included in this estimation
while security policies stored in ﬁrewall BRAMs are taken
into account in this analysis.
In order to compare our solution to a centralized approach
like SECA where controls are done in the manager entity,
it is assumed that each transfer requires 4 more cycles (a
normal transfer on AXI bus takes 2 clock cycles [12]): it
represents the latency to communicate between a ﬁrewall
and the security manager of the system. Therefore, giving
the picDec application deﬁned in Section V-B, a centralized
implementation like SECA would give a 6.27% latency over-
head while our solution has a 4.18% overhead: it represents
a 33% latency decrease.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
This work proposes distributed and ﬂexible security en-
hancements for bus-based MPSoC that embed protection
mechanisms where existing solutions are mainly centralized
(which involves additional latency overhead for communi-
cation between security elements). Our solution has low
latency overheads and can be further improved by pipelining
data management. In terms of area, LF and CF have low
resources consumption: the major penalty is due to the AES-
GCM core. Our solution is a layer above the communication
protocol as our security enhancements do not modify the
communication protocol between the processors and the other
parts of the system. We plan to integrate reconﬁguration
of security services (i.e. modiﬁcation of security policies)
to counter some attacks against the system: this could be
done quite easily because Block RAMs containing Security
Policies have one data port left for a reconﬁguration processor
(it raises other issues such as ﬁrewall behavior during recon-
ﬁguration of SPs). In this work, policies are deﬁned using
address domains, it can be interesting to study the adaptation
to thread-speciﬁc security where each thread has its own
security policy. Finally, there is the question of scalability:
a single-layer bus allows around 32 IPs; we can imagine to
study beneﬁts of ﬁrewall implementations on a multi-layer
bus or a network-on-chip.
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